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Ben Craig is an economic advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Guillaume Rocheteau is an economist at the Bank.The authors have benefi ted from the comments of Ray Batina, Chuck Carlstrom, Richard Dutu, Sebastien Lotz, Ed Nosal, and Christopher Waller. They thank Patrick Higgins for his research assistance and Monica Crabtree-Reusser for editorial assistance. This paper extends recent fi ndings in the search-theoretic literature on monetary exchange regarding the welfare costs of infl ation. We present fi rst some estimates of the welfare cost of infl ation using the "welfare triangle" methodology of Bailey (1956) and Lucas (2000) . We then derive a money demand function from the search-theoretic model of Lagos and Wright (2005) and we estimate it from U.S. data over the period . We show that the welfare cost of infl ation predicted by the model accords with the welfare-triangle measure when pricing mechanisms are such that buyers appropriate the social marginal benefi t of their real balances. For other mechanisms, welfare triangles underestimate the true welfare cost of infl ation because of a rent-sharing externality. We also point out other ineffi ciencies associated with noncompetitive pricing, which matter for estimating the cost of infl ation. We then illustrate how endogenous participation decisions can mitigate or exacerbate the cost of infl ation, and we provide calibrated examples in which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. Finally, we discuss distributional effects of infl ation.
Introduction
Assessing the welfare costs of infl ation requires a sound understanding of the benefi ts of monetary exchange. The search theory of money, developed in the last 15 years from the pioneering works of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 , 1991 , offers such a framework. However, the fi rst generation of search models of money were based on assumptions that were too restrictive to be able to deliver useful insights for monetary policy (goods and money were indivisible, for example, individuals' portfolios were limited to one unit of one object, and so forth). These severe restrictions have been relaxed in several recent extensions of the theory, by Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 , Molico (1999) , and Lagos and Wright (2005) . The extensions have opened up the perspectives for a better understanding of the costs, and also maybe benefi ts, associated with infl ationary fi nance. As an example, Lagos and Wright provide estimates for the cost of 10 percent infl ation ranging from 1.4 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent of GDP.
Interestingly, these numbers are signifi cantly larger than estimates based on the traditional method developed by Bailey (1956) , which consists of computing the area underneath a money demand function. For instance, Lucas (2000) , using Bailey's approach, estimates the cost of 10 percent infl ation at slightly less than 1 percent of GDP.
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In this paper we clarify and extend recent fi ndings provided by models of monetary exchange to the evaluation of the cost of infl ation for society. Our approach consists of relating the measures of the welfare cost of infl ation obtained from different versions of the search-theoretic model of Lagos and Wright (2005) with the traditional measures based on the area underneath the money demand function. We show the conditions under which the two measures are consistent, and those under which they differ. We also disentangle the different effects of infl ation in search models of monetary exchange: a real-balance effect, an effect on participation decisions, and a distributional effect. We show that the estimates for the welfare cost of infl ation provided by the basic version of the search model of Lagos and Wright coincide with those provided by the Bailey method whenever money holders can appropriate the marginal social return of their real balances. This condition is satisfi ed when buyers have all the bargaining power to set prices in bilateral trades, or when pricing is competitive. If this condition does not hold, then the welfare cost of infl ation is larger than what traditional estimates predict. This discrepancy arises because of a rent-sharing externality associated with noncompetitive pricing mechanisms. We establish a simple relationship between the cost of infl ation, the area underneath the money demand function, and the buyer's share in the surplus of a trade. We also discuss various ineffi ciencies associated with different bargaining solutions.
We also extend the Lagos-Wright model by introducing participation decisions and trading frictions. We show that the measures of the cost of infl ation based on the Bailey methodology are in general misleading since they do not take into account the effects of infl ation on participation decisions.
We also illustrate how the presence of search frictions can mitigate or exacerbate the welfare cost of infl ation. We provide calibrated examples in which the Friedman rule, where the interest rate is set to zero, is not the optimal policy.
The Lagos-Wright model is based on assumptions that yield a degenerate distribution of money balances in equilibrium.
2 While these assumptions make the model tractable, they prevent an analysis of the distributional effects of infl ation. We reintroduce such effects by considering a simple extension of the Lagos-Wright model in which agents receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We discuss the distributional effects of monetary policy and the insurance role of infl ation.
2. Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 ) constructs a different model, which also yields a degenerate distribution of money balances. The economy is populated by households composed of a large number of members, who pool their money balances at the end of each period. See also Faig (2004) .
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the methodology Bailey (1956) developed to compute the welfare cost of infl ation. Next, we use a search-theoretic model to derive a money demand function, and we fi t this function to the data. This allows us to compute an alternative measure of the cost of infl ation and to compare it to the Bailey estimates. Then, the benchmark model is extended to discuss the importance of pricing mechanisms. Next, we consider participation decisions and search frictions. Finally, we introduce the distributional effects of infl ation.
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The "Welfare Triangle"
The traditional approach to measuring the cost of infl ation was developed by Bailey (1956) . The estimates provided by this approach will be useful in explaining some fi ndings of the search model. Bailey (1956) measures the welfare cost of infl ation by calculating the area underneath a money demand curve over an appropriate interval. We plot in fi gure 1 the (inverse) demand for real balances, where the cost of holding real balances, the nominal interest rate, is represented on the vertical axis. The demand for real balances is downward-sloping since individuals reduce their money balances and resort to alternative payment arrangements, such as credit or barter, as the interest rate increases. The area underneath the money demand relationship over the interval [m 1 , m*], the "triangle" ABC in fi gure 1, measures the welfare cost of having a positive interest rate r 1 instead of zero. (In this analysis, the interest rate is assumed to vary one to one with the infl ation rate.) Obviously, the welfare cost of infl ation is minimized when the nominal interest rate is zero. 4 This corresponds to the Friedman (1969) rule for optimal monetary policy. In the following, we will measure the cost of infl ation as the cost of raising the interest rate from r 0 = 3 percent, interpreted as the interest rate consistent with zero infl ation, to r 1 , say, the interest rate associated with 10 percent infl ation. Graphically, this cost is measured by the area ABDE.
We defi ne monetary assets according to the monetary aggregate M1, that is, currency and demand deposits. 5 Money demand is then defi ned by the aggregate money balances M1 divided by nominal gross domestic product. 6 The nominal interest rate, r, is measured by the short-term commercial paper rate. In fi gure 2, we represent each observation (r,m) by a circle for the period 1900-2000.
FIGURE 1 THE WELFARE TRIANGLE
3. A more detailed presentation of the model occurs in appendix 1, and the data are given in appendix 2.
4. Since the interest rate is approximately the sum of a constant real interest rate and the infl ation rate, the Friedman rule would imply that the infl ation rate is negative and approximately equal to the opposite of the real interest rate.
5. Alternatively, several authors, including Fischer (1981) , defi ne money as high-powered money. The operational defi nition of monetary assets is somewhat arbitrary. For a discussion, see Lucas (1981) and Marty (1999) .
6. By measuring real balances as a fraction of domestic output, the area of the money triangle can be interpreted as the fraction of income that is needed to compensate individuals for an interest rate of r 1 instead of zero (Lucas, 2000) .
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To measure the welfare triangle, one estimates a curve that fi ts the observations in fi gure 2, and then computes the appropriate area underneath the implied money demand curve. Lucas (2000) considers two specifi cations for money demand: the log-log specifi cation, m r Ar ( ) = −η , where m is aggregate real balances divided by output, r is the interest rate, and A and η are two estimated parameters; and the semilog specifi cation, where m r Ae r ( ) = −η . In order to estimate the parameters A and η we use nonlinear least squares. 7 We also estimate the money demand curve by using a kernel regression.
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It can be seen in fi gure 3 that the welfare cost associated with an interest rate of 13 percent (10 percent infl ation, approximately) is quite different across specifi cations for the money demand function, from slightly more than 0.5 percent to slightly less than 1.5 percent. These differences simply refl ect different ways to fi t the data. According to the R-squared criterion, the best fi t is obtained for the kernel regression which evaluates the cost of 10 percent infl ation at about 1 percent of GDP. This number is similar to Lucas's measure. The estimate from the semilog specifi cation, about 1.5 percent of GDP, is comparable to Lagos and Wright's smallest estimate of the welfare cost of infl ation.
Search for a Money Demand Curve
The Bailey approach does not identify explicitly the benefi ts of monetary exchange for society. 10 An alternative approach consists of constructing a microfounded model economy in which money has an essential role in trades, so that there is a well-specifi ed demand for real balances and a natural measure of welfare. A theory that emphasizes the transactional role of money is the search approach of monetary exchange pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 , 1991 . The recent extension proposed by Lagos and Wright (2005) describes an economy in which trades take place under different market structures. Some trades occur in a decentralized (or search) market, where buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally, and other trades occur in a centralized market. Money is useful because of a standard double-coincidence-of-wants problem in the decentralized market: The buyer does not produce a good that the seller wants to consume.
FIGURE 2 FITTING MONEY DEMAND
7. This method is different from the one used by Lucas (2000) , who constrains the curves to pass through the geometric means of the data and who uses a visual test to identify the best fi t.
8. The kernel was estimated with a local bandwidth computed using plug-in techniques, modifi ed at each boundary. See Brockman et al. (1993) .
9. For the kernel regression, R 2 =0.6795; for the log-log specifi cation, R 2 =0.6238; for the semilog specifi cation, R 2 =0.6750. 10. The Bailey analysis is subject to the following caveats. It is a partial equilibrium analysis that assumes away externalities, general equilibrium effects, and distributional effects. Also, an underlying assumption is that the government has access to nondistorting taxes, so that a change in seigniorage revenue has no welfare consequences.
The instantaneous utility of an agent is u q c q x b s ( ) ( ) − + , where q b is the consumption and q s is the production in a bilateral match, and x is the net consumption in the centralized market (x is negative if an agent produces more at night than he consumes). 11 The probability of a single-coincidenceof-wants meeting in which an agent meets someone who produces a good he likes is σ ≤ 1 2 . There are no double-coincidence-of-wants meetings in which agents could use barter. So with probability σ an agent is a buyer in a bilateral match, with probability σ he is a seller, and with probability 1 2 − σ he is unmatched. A social planner, who would dictate the quantities to produce and consume, would chooseb s = = *, where q* satisfi es ′ = ′ u q c q ( *) ( *) . The socially effi cient level of production and consumption in the centralized market is indeterminate. The quantity of fi at money in the economy is growing at a constant rate, π , through lump-sum transfers in the centralized market.
Denote z(q) as the real balances that an agent must hold in order to buy the quantity13. Since agents readjust their real balances in the centralized market, the output A must be at least equal to σz. One needs to take a stand on how prices (or terms of trade) are determined in decentralized markets in which buyers and sellers are matched bilaterally. We will assume here that the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller is such that the seller is exactly compensated for his production cost, z q c q ( ) ( ) = . This bargaining solution, called the dictatorial solution, is the outcome of a game in which the buyer makes an offer which the seller can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected, no trade takes place. After some calculation, aggregate real balances satisfy
As in the previous section, the parameters A and η can then be estimated from the data for the U.S.
economy from 1900 to 2000. The parameter A could be interpreted as the extent of the tax base. The parameter η represents the sensitivity of individual real balances to changes in the interest rate.
In order to measure the welfare cost associated with a given interest rate, r, relative to 3 percent (the interest rate consistent with zero infl ation), we ask the following question. What is the percentage of total consumption that individuals would be willing to sacrifi ce in order to be in the steady state with an interest rate of 3 percent instead of the steady state associated with r?
In fi gure 4, we compare the two measures of the welfare cost of infl ation, namely, the compensated measure and the welfare triangle measure. The welfare triangle measure is the area underneath the money demand function as estimated from the search model. Figure 4 shows that the two measures are nearly identical. In order to understand this result, consider the individual demand for real balances given by 
. Compute the area underneath this money demand function over the in-
Using the assumed dictatorial solution, where the seller is exactly compensated for production costs, z c q = ( ), it is easy to see that the right-hand side of the previous expression is just the change in steady-state welfare. So the area underneath the individual demand for real balances coincides with the change in steady-state welfare. These two measures do not exactly coincide in fi gure 4 because we express real balances as a fraction of aggregate output and we do not look at the change in steadystate welfare but at a compensated measure of welfare.
The welfare cost of a nominal interest rate of 13 percent relative to a 3 percent interest rate is about 1.5 percent. 14 This measure is bigger than the ones of Lucas (2000) but it accords with the nonlinear least square estimate based on the semilog specifi cation. The difference between the numbers simply stems from different strategies of fi tting the points in the data. In all cases, the cost of infl ation corresponds to the area underneath a money demand function.
Pricing
The estimate for the welfare cost of infl ation in the previous section has been obtained by assuming a special pricing mechanism: Buyers are able to extract the whole surplus from trade. Alternatively, one can model prices, and the way in which the surplus from a trade is shared between trading partners, differently. In this section, we consider fi rst a simple bargaining solution, called the proportional solution, which will illustrate the role played by the pricing mechanism in assessing the welfare cost of infl ation. The proportional bargaining solution assumes that the buyer obtains a constant fraction, called the buyer's share and denoted θ, of the surplus of a match defi ned as the difference between the buyer's utility of consumption and the seller's disutility of production. Formally,
. The dictatorial solution of the previous section corresponds to θ = 1. From the agent's choice of real balances, one can fi nd a simple relationship between z, individual real balances, and the nominal interest rate, r. Aggregate real
We use the same method as before to derive the cost of infl ation: We estimate the parameters A and η of money demand generated by the model, and we use compensated welfare to compute the cost of infl ation. In fi gure 5, we report the welfare cost of infl ation for different values for the buyer's share θ = ( ) 0 3 0 5 0 8 1 . , . , . , . 16 When the buyer's share is less than 1, the cost of infl ation is typically larger than the measure given by the money triangle. In fact, the area of the welfare triangle is approximately equal to the buyer's share multiplied by the compensated measure of the welfare cost of infl ation. For instance, if the buyer's share is 50 percent, the welfare cost of infl ation is always about twice the size of the area of the money triangle (see fi gure 6). To understand this result, consider the area underneath the individual demand for real balances. It satisfi es
[ ]
14. Assuming a competitive pricing mechanism, Wright (2004, 2005) and Reed and Waller (2004) fi nd similar estimates for the welfare cost of infl ation, between 1 and 1.5 percent of GDP.
15. Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) also show, using a cash-in-advance model with a credit sector, that the welfare cost of infl ation using an estimated money demand curve is consistent with the prediction of the model.
16. The R 2 for the case of θ = 1 0 . is 0.6757, which is higher than the log-log and semilog parametric models above. Other values of θ gave smaller values for the R 2 than the semilog model.
FIGURE 5 WELFARE COST OF INFLATION UNDER PROPORTIONAL BARGAINING
It is equal to the change in steady-state welfare multiplied by θ. In fi gure 6, real balances are divided by aggregate output, and the welfare metric of the model is a compensated measure, which explains the slight discrepancy between the two lines.
As one varies the buyer's share from 0.3 to 1, the cost of 10 percent infl ation varies from slightly more than 1 percent to 6 percent of GDP. In order to understand why the welfare triangle can underestimate the true welfare cost of infl ation, consider the following example. Suppose that each unit of good produced in a bilateral match is worth $1 for the buyer and costs $0.9 to produce. The marginal surplus of a trade is then $0.1. Suppose that the price is $0.95, so that both the buyer and the seller get a surplus of $0.05. The private return of money is equal to the buyer's surplus divided by the amount of money that the buyer must carry to buy the good, 0.05/0.95 = 5.2 percent. The social return of money is the total surplus divided by the price of the good, 0.1/0.95 = 10.5 percent. If the interest rate is 10 percent, the cost of holding $0.95 for the buyer is larger than the marginal gain of $0.05. So the buyer has no incentive to bring an additional dollar even though the return of this dollar to society is larger than the opportunity cost incurred by the buyer.
This discrepancy between the private and social benefi ts of real balances arises from a rent-sharing externality. The marginal benefi t of the real balances from the buyer's point of view is smaller than the marginal benefi t from society's point of view. Since the money demand estimated from the data only captures the marginal benefi t of money from the buyer's side, the welfare triangle misses a fraction of the welfare cost of infl ation. This externality arises from any pricing rule that stipulates that the buyer does not get the full marginal return of his real balances.
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This point is illustrated in fi gure 7. For a given stock of real balances m 0 , the marginal benefi t that money provides to the money holder, the length of segment AB, is smaller than the marginal societal benefi t of money, the length of segment AD. If prices are determined according to a proportional solution, the ratio BA/DA is the buyer's share. As a consequence, when measuring the area underneath the demand for real balances, the ABC area, one underestimates the social benefi t of money, the ADC area, by a factor equal to the inverse of the buyer's share.
In fi gure 7, the two curves representing the private and social benefi ts of real balances intersect the horizontal axis (r = 0) for the same value m* of real balances. At this point, the total benefi ts of real balances are maximized for both buyers and society. This observation implies that the Friedman rule yields the best allocation of resources for society for all values of the buyer's share, θ .
The result in which the Friedman rule generates the fi rst-best allocation does not hold for all bargaining solutions. For instance, it does not hold for the Nash (1950) solution, according to which where θ is now the bargaining power of the buyer.
18 The buyer's share, Θ , depends on both θ and q, and it is equal to θ when q = q*. In particular, the buyer's share, Θ , decreases as q increases. As shown by Lagos and Wright (2005) , if prices in bilateral matches are determined according to the Nash solution, then the Friedman rule is optimal but the quantities traded in the decentralized market are too low. This result is illustrated in fi gure 8. At the Friedman rule (r = 0) the economy's real balances are m, while the real balances that would maximize society's welfare are m*. In other words, if the interest rate is zero, an individual's demand for real balances is satiated even though the marginal benefi t of money to society is still positive. This ineffi ciency is called a "nonmonotonicity ineffi ciency" to refl ect the fact that the buyer's surplus from a trade does not necessarily increase with the match surplus.
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Put differently, the buyer's surplus u q z q ( ) ( ) − reaches a maximum for a value of q smaller than q*.
This ineffi ciency has two important consequences for the welfare effects of infl ation. First, a small increase of the interest rate above r = 0 will have a larger effect on welfare than in the case under proportional bargaining solutions. Indeed, the welfare cost of a small interest rate can be approximated by the change in real balances multiplied by the social benefi t of real balances at r = 0. This second term, measured by the length of the segment EC in fi gure 8, is now positive at r = 0. Second, real balances are ineffi ciently low at r = 0, and, as a consequence, the quantities produced and consumed in bilateral matches are also too low. reveals that the welfare cost of 10 percent infl ation under the Nash solution is of same magnitude as the cost under the proportional bargaining solution. In both cases, there is a rent-sharing externality at work, which amplifi es the cost of infl ation. However, under the Nash solution, the buyer's share, Θ, gets larger for higher infl ation rates so that the rent-sharing externality gets smaller. The most noticeable difference between fi gures 5 and 9 is the gain associated with a reduction of the interest rate from 3 percent to zero (which corresponds to the optimal defl ation rate). This gain can be as high as 2.5 percent of GDP when the buyer's bargaining power is 0.3. Under the proportional solution, this
19. In order to illustrate this ineffi ciency, consider a bargaining problem where two individuals must share a prize. If one of the two individuals gets worse off as the size of the prize increases, then the bargaining solution is said to be nonmonotonic. For a detailed treatment of alternative bargaining solutions and their properties in monetary economies, see Rocheteau and Waller (2004) .
FIGURE 8 BARGAINING INEFFICIENCIES
18. The bargaining power θ , which varies from 0 to 1, is a measure of the buyer's strength in the bargaining process. In an explicit bargaining game with offers and counteroffers, the bargaining power of an individual depends, among other things, on his ability to threaten to terminate the negotiation if his offer is rejected. gain is about 0.5 percent of GDP. So the nonmonotonicity ineffi ciency is important in that it predicts large welfare gains if infl ation is reduced from zero to the optimal defl ation rate.
To conclude this section, we present a pricing mechanism which exhibits the same type of ineffi ciencies as the Nash bargaining solution but which is based on the possibly more familiar idea that prices are set as a markup over the cost incurred by sellers. 20 More precisely, the transfer of money from the buyer to the seller corresponds to the cost incurred by the seller in producing the amount asked for by the buyer multiplied by a constant factor, 1 + μ, (where μ ≥ 0 ), which we interpret as the "markup," z q c q ( ) ( ) ( ) = + 1 μ . As shown in fi gure 10, the cost of infl ation increases with the markup.
When the markup is 20 percent, the cost of 10 percent infl ation is slightly more than 3 percent of GDP, which is similar to the prediction of the model under the symmetric Nash solution. (2004) . Ennis (2004) describes an economy in which buyers have private information about their tastes, and sellers make take-it-or-leave-it offers. The annual welfare cost of a 10 percent infl ation in this model is between 4 percent and 7 percent of GDP. Figure 11 illustrates how a constant markup affects the assessment of the welfare cost of infl ation.
The constant markup, μ , shifts the curve indicating the social return of real balances up by a constant amount (BD = CE), which refl ects the seller's marginal benefi t from buyers' real balances. The larger the markup, the larger the difference between private and social benefi ts of real balances. Also, it is clear from fi gures 8 and 11 that both the Nash solution and the pricing with constant markup induce qualitatively similar effects of infl ation. In both cases, the quantities traded at the Friedman rule (r = 0) are too low.
Participation Decisions
In the basic model described in the previous sections, the frequency of trade is assumed to be constant. So infl ation affects the quantities traded in bilateral meetings, but it does not affect the number of those meetings. In order to endogenize the number of trade matches, one can let buyers and sellers choose whether or not to participate in the market, or let them choose on which side of the market to participate in, or even let them choose the resources they will invest in the search for a trading partner. 21 By taking into account these participation decisions, one can introduce general equilibrium effects of infl ation, which are not captured by the Bailey methodology. Also, in environments with search frictions, participation decisions tend to be ineffi cient. Consequently, the welfare effects of infl ation are ambiguous and depend on the way in which infl ation distorts participation decisions.
We consider in the following an extension of the Lagos-Wright model, which is based on an assumption in Shi (1997) . 22 The economy is similar to the one previously described except that at the beginning of each period, before matches are formed, individuals can choose to be buyers or sellers in the decentralized market. For instance, agents in the labor market can choose to be buyers (entrepreneurs) or sellers (workers). An agent who chooses to be a buyer cannot produce during the day, while an agent who chooses to be a seller cannot consume during the day. The composition of buyers and sellers is then endogenous. Let n denote the fraction of sellers in the economy. Assume further that the matching process is such that a buyer meets a seller with probability n, whereas a seller meets a
FIGURE 11 CONSTANT MARKUP
21. Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider a model with free entry of sellers. Shi (1997) describes an economy in which individuals can choose which side of the market to participate in. See also Rocheteau and Wright (2004) and Faig (2004) . Li (1995 Li ( , 1997 introduces endogenous search intensities. buyer with probability 1 -n. 23 The fraction of sellers in equilibrium is such that agents are indifferent to being buyers or sellers,
Our model is similar to the one in Rocheteau and
The left-hand side of the previous equation is the expected utility of a buyer, the right-hand side is the expected utility of a seller, and q is the equilibrium quantity traded in bilateral matches. 24 We assume that prices are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution,
The equilibrium allocation is socially effi cient if θ = 0.5 and r = 0. The second requirement corresponds to the Friedman rule, and it guarantees that q = q*. The fi rst requirement, θ = 0.5, is the condition under which the number of trades is maximized; this maximization requires n = 1/2. It corresponds to the Hosios (1990) condition according to which the number of trades is effi cient only in the unlikely event that an agent's share of the match surplus is equal to his marginal contribution to the creation of trade matches. 25 The best outcome for a search monetary economy requires that both the Hosios condition and the Friedman rule hold.
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The defi nition of the aggregate demand for money is the money held by the 1 -n buyers divided by the sum of the output in the decentralized market, n(1 -n)z, and the output in the centralized
We use the same strategy as before to estimate the parameters A and η of money demand. In fi gure 12, we report the welfare cost of infl ation. When the buyer's share is less than 50 percent, the number of buyers is too low and infl ation lowers the fraction of buyers even further. The welfare cost of low infl ation is then larger than what would be obtained under the assumption in which the frequency of trades is constant. Reciprocally, the welfare gains from reducing the interest rate to zero are also large. When the buyer's share is above 50 percent, a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. 23. The specifi cation for the matching function is the same as the one used in most monetary models, including Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) . Obviously, it would be desirable to estimate the transaction technology. This strategy has been pursued successfully in the labor literature. We leave this extension for future investigation.
24. The money supply is growing through lump-sum transfers. Such transfers do not affect agents' decisions to be buyers or sellers.
25. The elasticity of the number of trades with respect to the number of buyers in the economy is n. Therefore, the Hosios condition requires θ = n. When r = 0, n = − 1 θ , so that the optimal allocation requires θ = 0 5 . .
26.
For an elaboration of this idea, see Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2004) .
In this case, if r = 0, then the number of buyers is too high and the number of trades is too low. Since infl ation has a direct negative effect on buyers' expected utility, the number of buyers falls, while the number of sellers increases. 27 The composition in the market becomes more even and the number of trades increases. 28 When the buyer's share is 90 percent, then the cost of implementing the Friedman rule is about 0.5 percent of GDP while the cost of 10 percent infl ation is close to 0.
The results reported in fi gure 12 have been derived by assuming that terms of trade are set according to a proportional bargaining solution. As in the previous section, different bargaining solutions can have very different properties in terms of the effi ciency of the equilibrium allocation at the Friedman rule. For example, in the basic Lagos-Wright model, the equilibrium allocation is effi cient at the Friedman rule under the proportional bargaining solution, but it is ineffi cient under the Nash solution. Not too surprisingly, the choice of the pricing mechanism will also matter considerably for the welfare cost of infl ation when participation decisions are endogenous. 27. This effect is sensitive to the choice of the pricing mechanism. For instance, under the Nash solution the number of buyers can increase with infl ation because the buyer's share in the surplus of a match gets bigger.
28. The result in which the Friedman rule is not always optimal in the presence of search externalities could raise the following objection. If the government was able to make transfers contingent on agents' participation decisions, then it could take care of the search externalities by an appropriate transfer scheme, while the Friedman rule would be used to reduce the monetary wedge associated with the infl ation tax. In practice, however, it may be diffi cult to implement transfers contingent on agents' participation decisions since these decisions may not be observable. Infl ation, which is a tax on market activities, may be an effective instrument for correcting ineffi cient participation in the market.
29. For other parameterizations, a deviation from the Friedman rule could raise society's welfare. However, the result according to which a deviation from the Friedman rule is less likely under Nash bargaining than under proportional bargaining is robust.
than 2 percent of GDP when the frequency of trades is exogenous. Also, the welfare cost of infl ation is not a monotonic function of the buyer's bargaining power. An increase in the buyer's bargaining power makes the rent-sharing externality less severe, but it also distorts the composition of the market toward too many buyers.
To summarize, the introduction of endogenous participation decisions has several implications.
First, the welfare triangle is a misleading measure since it does not capture the distortionary effects of infl ation on individuals' participation decisions. Second, the presence of search externalities can mitigate or exacerbate the welfare cost of infl ation. Third, the Friedman rule may no longer be optimal, as the positive effect of infl ation on the composition of the market and the frequency of trades can dominate the negative effect of infl ation on real balances.
Distributional Effects
The Lagos-Wright model described in the previous sections has been designed in such a way that all agents, despite different trading histories in the decentralized market, start each period with the same money balances. This property of the model is what makes it tractable. However, because the distribution of money balances is degenerate, infl ation does not have any distributional effect. Levine (1991) , Molico (1999) , and Deviatov and Wallace (2001), among others, have provided examples in which a policy that consists of increasing the money supply through lump-sum transfers induces some redistribution across individuals. For individuals with large stocks of nominal assets, the burden associated with the infl ation tax is greater than the benefi t of receiving a lump-sum transfer. On the other hand, individuals with few nominal assets enjoy a net benefi t from the lump-sum transfer. In some circumstances this redistribution can be benefi cial to society. For example, if agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (on endowments, productivity, and so forth) that cannot be insured against, money growth can provide an insurance mechanism.
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We capture the distributional effects of infl ation through a simple extension of the Lagos-Wright model. Recall that in the Lagos-Wright model individuals live forever, and, in each period of their lives, they trade sequentially in a centralized market and a decentralized market. We depart from these assumptions by assuming that individuals live only two periods. They are born at the beginning of the centralized market, and they die at the end of the following period after the centralized market has closed. Also, agents do not discount utility across periods. When agents are born, they have access to the centralized market in order to make their choice of money balances. In the second period of their lives, they trade in the decentralized market and then have access to the centralized market before they die. Only a fraction p of the newly-born agents are able to produce in the fi rst period of their lives. One can interpret this assumption as individuals receiving productivity shocks. In the absence of money growth, agents who cannot produce cannot accumulate money and, therefore, cannot consume in the decentralized market in the second period of their lives. By infl ating the money supply the government can transfer money to all individuals, irrespective of their productivities, and therefore smooth consumption across all agents.
The demand for real balances from productive agents is the same as the one described in the previous sections. The main difference with respect to the previous models is the fact that the distribution of real balances has two points, z, the real balances of productive agents, and z , the real balances of unproductive agents. The aggregate demand for money balances is then 30. In Molico's (1999) version of the search-theoretic model, individuals trade only in a decentralized market with bilateral random matching. Since the matching process is random, trading opportunities arrive according to a stochastic process. Some individuals are lucky and can sell their output often: They then have a large stock of money balances. Other individuals are less lucky and have a low stock of real balances. Molico shows that for low infl ation rates the redistributive effect of infl ation, according to which infl ation acts as a subsidy for the poor and a tax on the rich, can dominate the real balance effect of infl ation, according to which infl ation reduces aggregate real balances. In Craig and Waller's (2004) version of a decentralized market with two currencies, one of which infl ates, low rates of infl ation can induce a strong redistributive effect in the infl ating currency where buyers are likely to hold either large amounts of the currency or none at all.
The strategy to estimate the model is the same as before. Society's welfare is measured by the sum of the trade surpluses in all matches. The welfare cost corresponding to an interest rate, r, is the fraction by which total consumption at the steady state with a 3 percent interest rate must be reduced in order to achieve the same welfare as the one that prevails at the steady state with r. 31 In fi gure 14, we plot the welfare cost of infl ation when prices are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution with θ = 1/2. As in Molico (1999) , society's welfare is maximized for a positive infl ation rate. The welfare gains associated with a positive interest rate are rather small. When calibrating the 31. Note that we kept the benchmark for the interest rate at 3 percent. Since agents do not discount future utility, this interest rate corresponds to a 3 percent infl ation.
model, the coeffi cient that describes the aversion of individuals toward risk is low (the coeffi cient of relative risk aversion is close to 0.2), and it is, in fact, lower than what is usually thought realistic.
If one increases this coeffi cient to make it a little bit more realistic, the welfare gain corresponding to the redistribution effect of infl ation gets larger. For example, in fi gure 15 we plot the cost of infl ation for the same value of the parameter A as the one used to draw fi gure 14 but for a coeffi cient of relative risk aversion raised to 0.5. The benefi ts of infl ation get signifi cantly bigger and increase with the probability that an agent receives a negative productivity shock.
Conclusion
We have presented some insights provided by the search theory of monetary exchange for the understanding of the welfare cost of infl ation. Using different extensions of the model of Lagos and Wright (2005) , we have identifi ed and quantifi ed various effects of infl ation on welfare. First, infl ation has a negative real balance effect. The infl ation tax introduces a wedge in the decision to invest in real balances. The extent of this distortion depends crucially on the assumed pricing mechanism. If buyers receive the full marginal benefi t of their money balances, the cost of infl ation is essentially the Bailey measure, given by the area underneath the money demand function. In all other cases, the Bailey measure has to be scaled up by a function that depends on the sellers' share in the surplus of a trade. We have also provided examples of pricing mechanisms under which the Friedman rule fails to generate the fi rst-best allocation. In such cases, the benefi t of implementing the optimal defl ation is large. Second, infl ation affects agents' decisions to participate in the market and therefore it affects the number of trades. However, since participation decisions tend to be ineffi cient in search environments, the effect of infl ation on participation choices can be welfare-enhancing or welfare-worsening. We have provided calibrated examples in which a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal. We have shown once again that the welfare effects of infl ation depend crucially on the pricing mechanism. Third, infl ation can generate a redistribution across agents. If agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, this redistribution can prove useful to society.
Additional extensions would be worth considering. As emphasized by Hansen (1989, 1991) and Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , the infl ation tax can distort a variety of marginal decisions:
among others, the leisure-consumption choice and the accumulation of capital. Aruoba and Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2004) have extended the Lagos-Wright model to allow for capital accumulation and have considered various assumptions regarding how capital enters the economy. Also, as Kocherlakota (2004) pointed out, it is important to extend search models in order to incorporate additional assets beside money, such as government bonds, and to take into account distortionary taxes. Finally, one can introduce realistic nominal rigidities in the search model of money along the lines suggested by Craig and Rocheteau (2004) . 
Pricing Mechanisms
The form of the function z(q) depends on the bargaining solution. If buyers have all the bargaining power, then z(q) = c(q) and the fi rst-order condition is
Using the specifi cations for the utility and cost functions, this gives
If terms of trade are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution, then the relationship between individual balances and the quantity traded in a match is given by 
If terms of trade are determined according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution where the buyer's bargaining power is θ , the pair (z,q) satisfi es
Finally, if prices are set as a constant markup over the cost incurred by sellers, the function z(q) satisfi es
The money demand function that is confronted with the data is defi ned as aggregate money balances divided by aggregate nominal output. It is equal to
where M is aggregate money balances, σ is the frequency of trades in the decentralized market, p is the price in the centralized market, and A is the real output in the centralized market. Since z = M/p, the money demand function is
If the pricing mechanism is "buyers take all" then the expression for money demand is
The frequency of trades is set to σ = 0.5 so that each individual is matched and is either a buyer or a seller. The parameters A and η are chosen to fi t money demand in the United States over the period 1900-2000. The same procedure is used for other pricing mechanisms.
Social and Private Marginal Returns of Real Balances
A marginal unit of real balances allows a buyer to buy ∂ ∂ q z / units of goods in the event a match occurs. The expected private marginal return of real balances, or equivalently, the expected increase of the buyer's utility from holding an additional unit of real balances, is then
, which is precisely r from the fi rst-order condition for the choice of real balances. The expected social marginal return of real balances is 
So the social return of real balances is equal to the interest rate divided by the buyer's bargaining power. Finally, if prices are determined according to a constant markup μ over the cost incurred by the seller then the social return of real balances is
So the social return of real balances is equal to the interest rate plus a constant term that is increasing in μ .
Accurateness of the Welfare Triangle Measure
The inverse money demand function of the search model is given by
where q(x) is the function that specifi es the output traded in bilateral matches as a function of real balances. Denote z 0 (z r ) the real balances at the steady-state equilibrium with an interest rate of 3 percent (r percent). Integrate the inverse money demand function from z r to z 0 in order to obtain the welfare triangle measure (denoted WT), 
0 0
In this case, he welfare triangle coincides exactly with the change in society's welfare. When prices are determined according to the proportional bargaining solution,
Now the welfare triangle measure is equal to the buyer's share times the change in society's welfare.
Measuring the Welfare Cost of Infl ation
Consider two steady states, one associated with an interest rate of 3 percent (the nominal interest rate that is consistent with 0 infl ation) and one associated with an interest r. The welfare cost of an interest rate r is measured by the rate Δ , at which consumption in the steady state with an interest rate of 3 percent must be decreased to make agents indifferent between this steady state and the steady state 
. . 
Endogenous Composition of Buyers and Sellers
We introduce an assumption used by Shi (1997) , and subsequently by Rocheteau and Wright (2004) , Rocheteau and Waller (2005) and Faig (2004) , to endogenize the frequency of trades. In the LagosWright model, each individual can be a buyer or a seller in the decentralized market depending on whom he meets. The frequency of trades is then given by an exogenous matching probability σ . We now allow each agent to choose on which side of the market to participate in: Each agent can choose to be a buyer or a seller in the decentralized market. Let n denote the fraction of sellers. The matching technology is such that a buyer meets a seller with probability n and a seller meets a buyer with probability 1 -n. So the aggregate number of trades is n(1 -n) and it is maximum when the composition of the market is symmetric, n = 1 -n = 1/2. The number of sellers in equilibrium is such that an agent is indifferent between being a buyer or a seller. Consequently, n satisfi es 
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where n r and q r are the values for n and q at the steady state corresponding to the interest rate r.
Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy
We now consider a variant of the Lagos-Wright model where individuals only live for three periods. All agents are born at the beginning of night before the centralized market opens, and they die at the end of the subsequent period after the centralized market closes. So agents can trade in the fi rst period of their life in the centralized market and in the second period of their life in both the decentralized market and the centralized market. For simplicity, we assume that agents do not discount future utility, ρ = 0, so that r = π . In the second period of their lives, agents are identical to the agents in the Lagos- 
